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JEREMY BENTHAM, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND
JUSTICE JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL
JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER*

The influence of legal philosophy upon the decision-making process
of the Supreme Court of the United States has largely been limited to
the natural law doctrines implicit or explicit in scattered opinions
written in virtually every historical period since 1789.1 In fact, with
the exception of a few pragmatists among the ninety-one individuals
who have served on the Court, advocates of natural law on the high
bench have scarcely encountered any serious opposition to this
philosophy. Consequently, the judicial career of Associate Justice
John Archibald Campbell is of especial interest, for Campbell attempted, in his brief tenure on the Court (1853-1861), to apply the
principles of a philosophy basically antithetical to that of natural
law, Benthamite utilitarianism. Natural law was most effectively
invoked during the Marshall Court period to establish contract
clause interpretations which became the cornerstones of economic
conservative doctrine. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the
consequences of the predominant influence of natural law for the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the contract clause prior to the
Civil War, and especially to explore the related contributions of this
early supporter of Benthamite utilitarianism, Justice John Archibald
Campbell.
Background of the Problem
Conflicts between the desire to meet the felt needs of society and the
desire to maintain existing property rights have long perplexed modern governments. The methods adopted for the resolution of such
conflicts quite naturally reflect the prevailing social and political
ideology in each nation. In the United States in the period of the
Philadelphia Convention, the prevailing temper, at least among the
influential, was one of insistence upon the preservation of the sanctity
of private property. This insistence and the widespread public
reverence for law and judicial institutions determined that state
interference with or modification of private contracts be subject to
a constitutional limitation prohibiting impairment of the obligation
of a contract. The constitutional framers, themselves extensive property holders and creditors, did not suggest in their debates that this
prohibition be extended to contracts of a public character. 2 How*Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of Iowa.
1. WRIGnT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 280-306 (1931).
WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAusE OF THE CONSTIUTI ON 16 (1938).

2.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL,. 11

ever, such an extension was made within three decades of the
framing of the Constitution through the judicial decision-making
process of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The main stream of contract clause interpretation before the Civil
War reflected the serious conflict between members of the Supreme
Court who sought to establish a doctrine of vested property rights
and those who opposed them. Protagonists of the vested rights doctrine, such as Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story,
endeavored to establish contract rights as virtually absolute. They
achieved a large measure of success during the period 1810-1827 by
broadening the constitutional definition of the word "contract" to
include public grants,3 corporate charters,4 and state legislative enactments which exempted particular tracts of land from state taxation. 5
The sweeping character of this doctrine as it applied to governmental
power was strikingly illustrated in Justice Story's concurring opinion
in the Dartmouth College case: 6 "[G]overnment has no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to a private person,
or a corporation, for special uses."
The supporters of judicial expansion of the scope of the contract
clause utilized three ideological approaches to justify such expansion.
To a limited extent, they depended upon legal analysis of the meaning
of the contract clause and allegations concerning the intentions of the
framers of the Constitution. To a much greater extent, they argued
upon the basis of economic expediency. And thirdly, and perhaps of
greatest importance, they grounded their interpretative policy solidly
upon the prevailing political and legal philosophy of natural law
and its conconmitant, natural rights.
It should be noted, of course, that the natural law philosophy need
not be considered exclusively an intellectual weapon of economic
conservatism. Even during the turbulent period of the American
Revolution, it became apparent that the conception of a law of nature
discoverable by right reason might be invoked by individuals for
basically contradictory purposes. Consequently, one enunciator of
radical democratic thought argued that "Nature itself abhors . ..

a

system of civil government [which bases representation upon property], for it will make an inequality among the people and set up a
number of lords over the rest," while contemporary conservative
property holders contended that a political system based upon natural
law required that the majority selected to make statutory laws for
a state "should include those who possess a major part of the property
3. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48 (1810).
4. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250 (1819).
5. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 103 (1812).

6. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250, 316-38 (1819).
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of the state."'7 However, it was in the later sense, as a protection for
property rights against the limitations upon such rights invoked by
representatives of popular majorities in the states, that the natural
law philosophy made its greatest impact in American legal circles
after 1789.
Perhaps the most important reason for the decidely conservative
emphasis given natural law in American legal training was the strong
influence of Blackstone. From the time of its appearance in America,
the Commentaries of Blackstone over-shadowed all the other contemporary works in law. Although Blackstone actually dealt with
the subject inconsistently, his emphasis upon "The Absolute Rights of
British Subjects" 8 conditioned generations of American lawyers in
their attitudes toward property rights. Furthermore, the Blackstonian
attitude toward individual rights was perpetuated in the writings and
teachings of the more influential American teachers of law in the
period before the Civil War, Chancellor Kent, Henry St. George
Tucker and Justice Joseph Story.9 In fact, natural law and natural
rights, with this decidedly conservative emphasis, remained an integral and vital part of American legal training long after both the
philosophy and the emphasis began to lose their importance outside
the field of American law.10 To most American students of law in the
pre-Civil War period, statements such as Chancellor Kent's reference
to the rights of personal security, personal liberty and the acquisition
and enjoyment of property as "natural, inherent and inalienable""
ones were basic to their intellectual conditioning for private practice
and, in many instances, public service.
During this period of the ascendency of the natural law philosophy
in American legal circles, an English intellectual leader, Jeremy Bentham, developed a body of philosophical doctrine which was implicity
antithetical to natural law, and, while not antagonistic to property
rights in general, was opposed to the perpetuation of property rights
when such immutable perpetuation thwarted the purpose of social
utility. Bentham did, of course, ground his utilitarian doctrine upon
a reference to nature: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."' 2 But nature,
in Bentham's analysis, did not provide an ideal standard for the resolution of social conflicts. Rather, the test was pragmatic: "It is for
them (pain and pleasure) alone to point out what we ought to do, as
7. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 104-13 (1931).
8. CORWIN, THE 'IGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 85 (1955).
9. WRIGHT, AmERIcAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 286-91 (1931).

10. Id. at 280.

11. Id. at 289, quoting

from KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1836).
12. 1 STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 237 (1900).
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In terms of social policy,

the test to be applied was whether a proposed course of action would
achieve the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." This standard
would inevitably find itself in conflict with a doctrine of vested property rights such as that espoused and applied by a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court of the United States during the period
1810-1827.
One of the strongest statements of Bentham's disavowal of the
conception of natural rights was his Critical Examination of the
Declaration of Rights which had been drawn up by the French National Assembly of 1791. Analyzing article II of the Declaration, 14
Bentham denied that there were rights anterior to the establishment
of governments and insisted, instead, that men who live without
government actually live without rights. All of the items listed in the
article as natural rights were, argued Bentham, in reality, secured
only under established government as legal rights. The attempt to
establish such rights as imprescriptable ones was denounced as
"rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon stilts." Under the utilitarian principle "there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous
to society, should not be abolished."' 5
Lest it be thought that Bentham's stricture against natural rights
was simply a manifestation of contemporary British distaste for the
excesses of the French Revolution, his Book of Fallacies castigates
those who would espouse the natural rights doctrine to protect legislatively granted privileges. The attempts by Coke and others to establish that certain laws were "irrevocable" or "immutable" was
termed "a sophism of the same cast as that expressed by the words
rights of man, though played off in another shape, by a different set
of hands, and for the benefit of different class.' 6
The utilitarian position on the immutability of laws was given by
Bentham in these terms:
Every arrangement by which the hands of the sovereignty for the time
being are attempted to be tied up, and precluded from giving existance
to a fresh arrangement, is absurd and mischievious; and, on the supposition that the utility of such fresh arrangement is sufficiently established, the existence of a prohibitive clause to the effective question
ought not to be considered as opposing any bar to the establishment of it
A declaration or assertation that this or that law is immutable, so

far from being a proper instrument to insure its permancy, is rather
a presumption that such a law has some mischievous tendancy.' 7
13. Ibid.

14. "The end in view of every political association is the preservation of the
natural and imprescriptable rights of man. These rights are liberty, property,
security, and resistance to oppression."
15. 2 BOWRMG, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAMV 500-01 (1843).
16. Id. at 403.
17. Id. at 407.
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It is not surprising the Blackstone was one of the first of the British
advocates of natural law and its correlative doctrine of natural rights
to be subjected to Bentham's attack. 18 But whether concerning Blackstone or his later American disciples, the Benthamite position brooked
no compromise with natural law or natural rights. Appeals to moral
laws or to the individual rights which were purportedly based upon
them were, in Bentham's eyes, not only unhistorical, but arbitrary because they lacked "any external standard." The principle of utility,
argued Bentham, supplied such a standard.
The political and legal philosophy of Jeremy Bentham had begun
to influence governmental leaders in many parts of the world by the
early years of the nineteenth century. During this period Americans
of such disparate characteristics as Aaron Burr and John Quincy
Adams conferred with Bentham personally. President Madison corresponded with the British utilitarian regarding a plan for codification
of the national laws, but this exchange did not bear fruit. Perhaps
the most important contribution to the American legal system was
the application of Bentham's ideas by advocates of revision of the state
legal systems. Notable successes were achieved in Louisiana under
the leadership of Edward Livingston 19 and in New York under the
initial direction of John Duer, Henry Wheaton, and Benjamin F.
Butler.20 However, there is little evidence in the development of
American legal philosophy to indicate widespread acceptance of
Benthamite utilitarianism, for, as was noted above, the natural law
philosophy retained much of its vigor in legal circles in America.
To be sure historian Richard Hildreth, 21 Harvard law professor
Nicholas St. John Green,22 and Thomas Cooper, president of South
Carolina College,23 ably espoused the utilitarian intellectual cause, but
these protagonists were not able to make any great impression upon
American legal development during their lifetimes. It is important
to note, however, that these leading American advocates of utilitarianism were out-and-out critics of natural law and natural rights. In
America, as in England, consequently, Benthamite utilitarianism
emerged as a legal and political philosophy which was basically in
conflict with the philosophy of natural law. In addition, the pragmatic
character of the Benthamite test of social desirability often made

18. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 238-40.
19. Id. at 220-21.
20. Stevenson, Influence of Bentham and Humphreys on the New York
Property Legislation of 1823, 1 Am. J. LEGAL IST. 155-69 (1957).
21. For an analysis of the social, economic and philosophic contributions
of Hildreth see PINGEL, AN AMEICAN UT=AR.AN (1948).
22. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND Te FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATIsM 152-71 (1945).

Green's major contributions to utilitarian thought were actually made after
the Civil War.
23. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 307-10 (1931).
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utilitarianism the logical enemy of conservative attempts at invocation of natural law and natural rights to perpetuate property rights.
The MarshallCourt and Contracts
During the early years of the nineteenth century, the very years in
which Bentham's political and legal philosophy was becoming increasingly influential in the western world, the advocates of application of the natural law philosophy on the Supreme Court of the
United States were achieving their most notable successes. As was
observed above, the scope of the contract clause was appreciably
broadened during the crucial years, 1810-1827, an expansion largely
facilitated by invocation of natural law. By 1827, the tide turned
against the supporters of a vested rights doctrine when a majority
of the Supreme Court refused to accept Chief Justice Marshall's argument that an existing state statute was void when it released a debtor
from a subsequent contract obligation,2 4 but the expansion of the
scope of the contract clause made prior to that date was not seriously
challenged either during the remainder of Chief Justice Marshall's
tenure or under the Chief Justiceship of his successor, Roger Brooke
Taney.
This failure to challenge the Marshall-Story expansion of the scope
of the contract clause obviously did not stem from absence of public
opposition, for Professor Benjamin F. Wright's careful survey of the
leading accounts of the public reaction to the Marshall Court's contract clause decisions indicated that these opinions "met with strong,
if not abusive, opposition."25 Furthermore, the long accepted tradition
that Chief Justice Marshall secured the interpretations that he
desired simply by the very power of his intellect and the force of
his personality has been thoroughly discredited by the researches of
Professor Donald G. Morgan.2 6 Rather, the failure to challenge the
economically conservative contract clause decisions resulted to a
great extent from the intellectual commitment to the philosophy of
natural law of Marshall's potential Jeffersonian opponents. Most of
the Jeffersonian Supreme Court members acquiesced silently in these
decisions, but Story, appointed as a Jeffersonian, became an unshakable advocate of Marshall's interpretation and an unusually strong and
outspoken supporter of the use of natural law to protect vested
property rights.27 Even the Jeffersonians who held deep reservations
about the contract clause expansion were virtually disarmed intellectually by their inability or unwillingness to cope with the natural
law foundation for this expansion. The judicial interpretations of
24. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 135 (1827).
25. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CoNsTITUTIoN 53-58 (1938).
26. Morgan, JusTIcE WIAm JOHNSON (1954).

27. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 23, 29 (1815).
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the contract clause made by the most vigorous protagonist of Jeffersonian Republicanism on the Supreme Court, Justice William Johnson
of South Carolina, are illustrative.
Although Justice Johnson was the leading dissenter during the
Marshall Court period, he actually acquiesced in most of the decisions extending the scope of the contract clause. In the initial case
of Fletcher v. Peck, Johnson disagreed with Marshall on virtually
every particular but concurred in the decision in a separate opinion
on natural law grounds. Then for over a decade, Johnson simply accepted silently the majority's subsequent expansion of the clause in
the key decisions of New Jersey v. Wilson, 9 Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,30 and Sturges v. Crowninshield.31 The reasons foi Johnson's silence were not completely clear, but the consequences certainly
were apparent. As Johnson's biographer aptly put it, "he had tolerated
the sanctification of vested rights at the expense of social interests. '32
What is somewhat surprising about Johnson's course of action is that
a rather valid argument was available which would have permitted
him to oppose the extension of the scope of the contract clause to
public grants without repudiating, in principle, the philosophy of
natural law. In Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall had argued that "it may
well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be
prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation. 3 3 This attempt at broadening the letter of the written
Constitution by an appeal to a law of nature which was considered
higher and prior to it was essentially similar to the efforts of several
justices, such as Samuel Chase, who had served under Marshall's
predecessors. One member of the pre-Marshall Court, Justice Iredell,
had directed a sharp, two-pronged attack upon one of the early attempts at introducing natural law in the interpretation of the Constitution. Iredell first had pointed out that while "some speculative
jurists" argued "that a legislative act against the natural justice must,
in itself, be void. . . ," under a constitutional system characterized by
separation of powers, "the judicial departments" possessed no authority to hold void laws which were not explicitly prohibited by the
Constitution. Secondly, "the ideas of natural justice are regulated by
no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have differed on the
subject; and all that the court could properly say in such an event,
28. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48 (1810).
29. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 103 (1812).
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250 (1819). Another Jeffersonian, Justice Duval,
dissented in the DartmouthCollege case, but did so without writing an opinion.
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 120 (1819).
32. MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 214-17.

33. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
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would be that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion)
had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent
Yet Justice Johnson's opinion
with abstract principles of justice."
in the Peck case contained no reference to Iredell's argument; instead,
he concurred in the majority decision because, in his opinion, a state
is prohibited to revoke its grants "on a general principle, on the
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even
on the Deity." 35
By the middle of the 1820's Justice Johnson began re-evaluating his
conception of the relationship of property rights and social interests.
His Eulogy on Jefferson of 1826 apparently contained his own convictions as well as those of the dead philosopher:
He [Jefferson] knew that avarice was the besetting sin of a republican
government. That the very security with which property was possessed,
not less than the influence which it confers; operating with some of the
leading propensities of our nature, fostered a devotion to its acquisition,
which he would have directed to more exhalted objects. He dreaded the
noxious and baneful influence of a passion for gain ....36
In 1827 in Ogden v. Saunders,37 after thirteen years of silence, Johnson again came to grips with the question of the immutability of
property rights. It is noteworthy that he felt impelled to rationalize
his repudiation of the doctrine of vested rights by explaining, in a
manner resembling the second of Justice Iredell's arguments, that
natural law in itself did not provide an adequate standard in the
interpretative process.
Johnson's position was not an abandonment of the natural law
philosophy, but was essentially a recognition that natural law had
limited efficacy as a guide to decision-making. His explanation implied, however, a deep and continuing intellectual commitment to
the philosophy. Given this intellectual commitment, the transition in
Johnson's thinking still was great, for if the interpretative standard
suggested below had been originally applied by the Marshall Court,
the whole course of contract clause interpretation would have been
considerably different. Johnson stated his position as follows:
The obligation of every contract will then consist of that right or power
over my will or actions, which I, by my contract, confer on another. And
that right and power will be found to be measured neither by moral law
alone, nor universal law alone, nor by the laws of society alone, but by a
combination of the three-an operation in which the moral law is explained and applied by the law of nature, and both modified and adapted
to the exigencies of society by positive law. The constitution [of the
34. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798); Corwin, The Basic
Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MicH. L. Rzv. 246, 250 (1914).
35. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 80.
36. MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 219-20.
37. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 135, 179 (1827).

1958]

THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

United States] was framed for society, and in an advanced state of society, in which I will undertake to say that all the contracts of men receive a relative, and not a positive interpretation: for the rights of all
must be held and enjoyed in subserviency to the good of the whole ... 38
So sweeping was Johnson's victory on this issue that Marshall found
himself in the position of a dissenter for the first and only time in a
major case. Yet while Ogden v. Saunders represented the high tide
of reaction against Marshall's development of an absolute doctrine
of vested rights, no serious attempt was made by the Jeffersonians to
overturn the earlier Marshall decisions. The remainder of Marshall's
tenure was not marked by any significant expansion of the scope
of the contract clause, but neither was it marked by any serious contraction. Of particular significance, philosophically, was the fact that
Marshall's tenure paralleled the first three decades of the spread of
Bentham's intellectual influence throughout the western world. And
for the Supreme Court of the United States, like much of the rest of
the American legal system, Benthamite utilitarianism, implicitly one
of the most powerful philosophical challenges to the natural law
philosophy, remained a remote and relatively unimportant intellectual
influence. It should be noted, however, that Justice Johnson's expression of distaste for the use of natural law as a guide to decisionmaking concluded with a reference to the relative nature of individual
rights which was similar to the Benthamite test of social desirability.
The Taney Court and Contracts
The death of Marshall and the advent of the new Chief Justice
brought no fundamental change in the Supreme Court's treatment
of the contract clause. The three broadest interpretations of the
clause made by the Marshall Court-New Jersey v. Wilson, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, and Fletcher v. Peck-were as firmly
entrenched at the end as at the beginning of the Taney Court period.
The major decisions of the Taney Court which have variously been
described as liberal or even radical did not challenge the immutability
of established and recognized contracts, but concerned themselves
with peripheral issues such as the resolution of ambiguities in contracts 39 or the determination of the question whether an agreement of
one kind or another is a contract within the meaning of the Consti40
tution.
For most of the members of the Taney Court, and particularly
Justice McLean, the reasoning of Marshall in his early, determinative
38. Ibid.

39. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 341
(1837).
40. See, e.g., East Hartford v. East Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.)
536 (1850).
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decisions was accepted and applied approvingly. The philosophical
basis for these decisions was no longer invoked, but since natural law
was an integral part of these precedents, the Taney Justices, by
adherence to stare decisis, gave tacit approval to it.41 Since the purpose of the invocation of natural law, the broadening of the scope
of the contract clause, had been accomplished, further invocation of
the philosophy was unnecessary.
It was not until the closing decade of the Taney Court era that the
philosophical antithesis of natural law, Benthamite utilitarianism, began to exert limited influence in the Court's interpretative process.
By this time the opportunity for direct utilization of Bentham's ideas
to attack the natural law foundation for the doctrine of vested rights
was, for practical purposes, lost. However, late in the Taney Court
period, the appointive process brought to the high bench a supporter
of broader state control of property and business who was quite capable of ingenious application of Benthamite philosophy to the bitter
issues of contract clause interpretation. This was the successor to
Justice McKinley, John Archibald Campbell of Alabama.
The Intellectual Attributes of Justice Campbell
Throughout American history, the men who have been chosen as
members of the Supreme Court have, with very few exceptions, been
well educated. But few of these appointees could in any true sense
be referred to as possessors of a broad education in political and legal
theory and an intellectual attitude of deep philosophic understanding.
In the twentieth century perhaps only Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Benjamin N. Cardozo would qualify. Over a century ago, such a
man was appointed as associate justice in the midst of a period singularly unsuited for the retention of philosophic detachment-the decade
42
before the outbreak of the Civil War.

John Archibald Campbell possessed an unusual combination of
abilities. At the time of his appointment in 1853, he was referred
to as one of the most distinguished lawyers of his time. He was (and
in fact still is) the only Justice who was appointed by a President
upon the advice of all of the members of the Supreme Court. And
of particular significance to this study, he was reputed to have
41. As a matter of fact where fundamental differences arose over the
property right of slavery, a propensity to invoke natural law manifested
itself; Justice McLean, for example, in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
449, 508 (1841), argued that, "Each state has a right to protect itself against
the avarice and intrusion of the slave dealer; to guard its citizens against the
inconveniences and dangers of a slave population ....The right to exercise
this power, by a state, is higher and deeper than the Constitution."

42. For a different view of Campbell's intellectual qualities, see Twiss,

CoNSTInUTIoN 44 (1942). Twiss concludes that Campbell's
"mnind was clear in its conceptions but without imagination, being massive
rather than analytical."
LAWYERS AND THE
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(and to have used intensively) the most extensive private law library
in America.43 Today, when Campbell is referred to at all, it is generally his remarkable rise to professional eminence after the Civil
War and his arguments as counsel in behalf of the butchers of New
Orleans in The Slaughterhouse Cases44 that are cited. His intellectual
accomplishments on the Supreme Court in the years 1853-1861 were
almost immediately overshadowed by the Civil War. As an individual,
Campbell was not a popular figure. His public advocacy of measures
to better the conditions of slaves, his liberation of his own slaves
upon his acceptance of the associate justiceship, and his pre-Civil
War opposition to secession embittered many Southerners, while his
resignation from the Supreme Court and coldly-received services to
5
the Confederacy scarcely endeared him to the victorious Northerners.4
Perhaps the best measure of Campbell's erudition is the quality of
his judicial pronouncements and the scope of his knowledge of continental European as well as English jurisprudence. His mastery of
civil law was unmatched on the Court. His familiarity with Roman
and Canon law,4 with the contributions of Savingy and the French
commentators Pardesses, Lorce, Boulay, Paty and Pothier,47 and
with English legal history clearly made Campbell unique among his
contemporaries on the Supreme Court. In his dissent in Jackson v.
Steamboat Magnolia,8 Campbell wrote an extensive and lucid analysis of English legal history which directly challenged the virtual intellectual monopoly in this field of the late Justice Joseph Story. A
measure of the felicity of Campbell's literary style is present in his
acid comment-"The opinion of Justice Story, in the cause of Delovio
v. Boit, is celebrated for its research, and remarkable .. for its boldness in asserting novel conclusions, and the facility with which
authentic historical evidence that contradicted them is disposed of." 49
Campbell's utilitarian spirit revealed itself in many judicial pronouncements which did not involve direct citation of Bentham or his
disciples. Campbell's analysis of the principle of res judicata in Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown Steam Packing Company v.
Sickles5o is illustrative. In his dissents in Jackson v. Steamboat Mag43. CONNOR, Jomn ARcmBALD CAMPBELL 16-20 (1920); 3 DIcrioNARY OF
AviERicA

BioGRAPHY, 456-59 (1929).

44. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).

45. CONNOR, op. cit. supra note 43 at 192-98; Duncan, John Archibald Campbell, 5 TRNSACTIONS ALA. HIST. Soc'Y 107, 110 (1904).

46. See Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown Steam Packing Co. v.

Sickles, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 333 (1860).

47. See Campbell's analysis of Roman law and modem continental civil
law in Executors of McDonogh v. Murdock, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 367 (1853).
See also his opinion for the Court in Wanzer v. Truly, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 584
(1854); and his dissent in Dupont de Nemours v. Vance, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
162 (1856).
48. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857).
49. Id. at 336.

50. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 333 (1860).
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nolia5l and Dodge v. Woolsey,52 Campbell drew upon the writings of
Bentham's disciple, Sir John Romilly, and Bentham's legislative
supporter and popularizer, Lord Brougham.53 However, when Campbell had occasion to discuss fundamental problems of jurisprudence,
such as the question of irrevocable laws, he preferred, as will be seen,
to draw upon the doctrines and social analyses of Bentham himself.
Like Bentham, Campbell viewed dogmatic assertions regarding doctrinal alternatives in jurisprudence simply as manifestations of ideological competition to favor or defeat various interests in society.
Thus after conducting a careful analysis of English legal history regarding admiralty jurisdiction, Campbell concluded this portion of his
dissent in the Jackson case with this characteristic ideological flourish
-- "The error of [Story's] ... opinion [in Delovio v. Boit] ... consists
in its adoption of the harsh and acrimonious censures of discarded
an discomfited civilians on the conduct of the great patriots of England,
whose courage, sagacity, and patriotism, secured the rights of her
people, as any evidence of historical facts. ' 54 However, the best example of this facet of Campbell's judicial philosophy is in the striking
social analysis contained in his dissent in Dodge v. Woolsey which
is discussed below.
Justice Campbell and PropertyRights
In order to present a complete picture of Justice Campbell's contract
clause interpretations, it is necessary to describe briefly his attitudes
toward several judicial issues which, while not involving interpretation
of the contract clause, did indicate his feelings toward property rights
in general and corporation privileges in particular. In Campbell's time,
the chief burden of the social regulation of property rights, corporate
or otherwise, lay with the state. The chief avenues of escape from
state regulation lay, conversely, in the invocation of the federal
contract clause or in the establishment of federal court jurisdiction
as a legal alternative to the generally more hostile state court systems.
Prior to Campbell's appointment, the Taney Court had enlarged the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to include corporations within the
meaning of the word "citizen" in diversity of state citizenship cases
arising under article III of the Constitution.55 In Marshallv. Baltimore
& 0. R.R.,56 Campbell opposed this opinion in a dissent which emphasized the dangers to state governments presented by corporations
whose "revenues and establishments mock at the frugal and stinted
51. 61 U.S. (20
52. 59 U.S. (18
53. 1 STEPHEN,
54. 61 U.S. (20
55. Louisville,
478 (1844).
56. 57 U.S. (16

How.) 296, 324 (1857).
How.) 331, 368 (1855).
op. cit. supra note 12, at 186-87, 225-27.
How.) at 332-41.
Cincinnati and Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
How.) 314 (1853).
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conditions of state administration; [whose] pretensions and demands
are sovereign, admitting, impatiently, interference by state legislative
authority."
Justice Campbell's majority opinion in Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. &
C. R.R. 57 harbingered Louis Brandeis' modern emphasis upon the
need for corporation boards of directors to assume a greater sense of
moral responsibility in dealing with stockholders and the investing
public. As Campbell put it,
A corporation, quite as much as an individual, is held to a careful
adherence to truth in their dealings with mankind, and cannot, by
their representations or silence, involve others in onerous engagements,
and then defeat the calculations and claims their own conduct has
superinduced.58
The contract clause issue which absorbed much of Campbell's intellectual interest and which stimulated his application of Benthamite
principles to contract clause interpretation was closely related to the
issues underlying the jurisdictional cases discussed above. At the
heart of all these issues was the question whether the state governments, then the primary protectors of social interests, would be
placed by constitutional interpretation in a position in which they
would be powerless to control or regulate the predatory activities
of corporations. The resolution of this question had important consequences both for the evolution of American federalism and the
development of American social and economic relationships.
Of grave concern in these matters was the continued vitality of
state taxing power in the face of limitations earlier imposed by the
Marshall Court's decision in New Jersey v. Wilson. 59 This decision
had established the precedent that a state, by granting exemptions,
might perpetually bargain away its indispensible taxing power.
Shortly after his appointment, Campbell took part in the decision
of the Taney Court in Piqua Branch of the State Bank v. Knoop. 60
An enactment of the Ohio Legislature had changed the method of
taxation of banks in a manner different from the system established
in the original charters. The Court's majority ruled, in accordance
with the earlier view of the Marshall Court, that the taxation provision of the bank's charter was an irrevocable contract protected
against subsequent state changes by the Federal Constitution. Justices
Catron, Daniel and Campbell dissented, Catron writing a separate
opinion based essentially on state sovereignty. Daniel supported
Campbell's more broadly based dissent.
57. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 381 (1859).
58. Id. at 400-01.
59. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 103 (1812).
60. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vor'. 11

While Justice Campbell did not explicitly refer to Bentham in his
dissent in the Knoop case, his attack upon the majority's position was
Benthamite in spirit in its insistence upon measuring the desirability
of social policy in terms of its consequences, and in its emphasis upon
the treatment of property rights as relative and subject to alteration
when necessary for the achievement of a more desirable social purpose. State sovereignty also received great attention, but it is significant that Campbell equated the claims of state sovereignty with
social obligation and social control of corporate behavior.
Campbell first argued that application of a doctrine of immutable
contract rights to tax privileges granted by a legislature was incompatible with the principle of legislative sovereignty in a free
society. In this respect he pointed out that:
The subject matter of this section [of the Ohio tax law] is the contributive
share of an important element of the productive capital of the State to the
support of its government. The duty of all to make such a contribution in
the form of an equal and apportioned taxation, is a consequence of the
social organization. The right to enforce it is a sovereign right, stronger
than any proprietary claim to property.... [The amount, conditions and
time of tax payments are left to the] discretion of the legislative authority
...there is no promise that the same authority may not, as it clearly
has a right to do, apportion a different rate of contribution. I will not
say that a contract may not be contained in a law, but the practice is not to
be encouraged, and courts discourage the interpretation which discovers
them.61

The last statement regarding the attitude of courts must be categorized as a hope rather than a description of the reality of the situation, for most state courts as well as the Supreme Court under
Marshall and Taney actually tended to support the sanctification of
statutory taxation privileges as vested contract rights.
Campbell recognized this implicitly, and attempted, in the following
statement, to develop an interpretative distinction which would enable
him later to persuade the Court's majority to permit greater state
legislative discretion in the withdrawal of such privileges without

openly repudiating the doctrines of New Jersey v. Wilson and the
DartmouthCollege case.
The whole society is under the dominion of law, and acts, which seem
independent of its authority, rest upon its toleration. The multifarious
interests of a civilized state must be continually subject to the legislative
control. General regulations, affecting the public order, or extending
to the administrative arrangements of the State, must overrule individual
hopes and calculations, though they may have originated in its legislation. It is only when rights have vested under laws that the citizen can
claim a protection to them as property. Rights do not vest until all the
61. Id. at 407.
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conditions of the law have been fulfilled with exactitude during its continuance, or a direct engagement has been made, limiting legislative power
over and producing an obligation ....
A plain distinction exists between the statutes which create hopes,
expectations, faculties, conditions and those which form contracts. These
banks might fairly hope that without a change in the necessities of the
State, their quota of taxes would not be increased, and that while payment was punctually made the form of collection would not be altered.
But the general assembly represents a sovereign, and as such designated
this rule of taxation upon existing considerations of policy, without annexing restraints on its will, or abdicating its prerogative, and consequently was free to modify, alter, or repeal the entire disposition.62
The basic issue raised in the Knoop case was presented in different
form in the case of Dodge v. Woolsey. 63 Here a majority of the members of the Taney Court held unconstitutional an Ohio constitutional
amendment which altered the method of taxing state banking corporations. The alteration was essentially the same as that which had
been attempted by state legislative action some years earlier. The
latter had been held unconstitutional under the contract clause in
the Knoop case. The court majority in the Dodge case held the state
constitutional amendment void under the Knoop doctrine.
Justice Campbell's dissent in Dodge v. Woolsey was technically an
objection to the extension of the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases
involving diversity of state citizenship in which stockholders sought
to enjoin actions of a corporate board of directors which were in
compliance with state taxation laws. However, it contains the clearest
exposition of Campbell's essentially utilitarian view that judicial
policy should be determined by social utility rather than rigid adherence to the notion that certain laws are irrevocable. In developing
his analysis of the social consequences of the majority opinion, Campbell drew upon the writings of Bentham's disciple, Romilly, and, as
will be seen, Bentham himself. The major portion of Campbell's
analysis follows:
The proposition of this confederacy of some fifty banking corporations,
having one fortieth of the property of the state, is that by the law of
their organization for the whole term of their corporate being, there
exists no power in the government nor people of Ohio to impair the concessions contained in the Act of 1845, particularly that determining the
amount of their contribution to the public revenue ....
In . . . [the Turkish Empire], the ecclesiastical and judicial is the
dominent interest, for the Ulemas are both priests and lawyers, just
as the corporate moneyed interest is dominant in Ohio, and in either
country that interest claims exemption from the usual burdens and
ordinary legislation of the State. The [present] judgment of this court
would establish the permanent existance of such an incumbus upon the
62. Id. at 408.
63. 59LT.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
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resources and growth of that country, if that interest should have taken
their privileges in the form of a contract, and had such a constitution
as ours. Yet the first step for the regeneration of Turkey, according to
the wisest statesmanship, is to abolish [this privileged exemption] the
vakuf.
Bentham, treating upon constitutional provisions in favor of contracts,
says: "If all contracts were to be observed, all misdeeds would be committed, for there is no misdeed the committal of which may not be made
the subject of a contract; and to establish in favor of themselves, or of
any other person or persons, and absolute despotism, a set of legislators
would have no more to do than to enter into any engagement . . .for
this purpose." And were this to happen, should it be that a state of
this Union had become the victim of vicious legislation, its property
alienated, its powers of taxation renounced in favor of chartered associations, and the resources of the body politic cut off, what remedy has the
people against the misgovernment? Under the doctrines of this court
none is to be found in this government, and none exists in the inherent
64
powers of the people, if the wrong has taken the form of a contract.
The extension of jurisdiction approved by the Supreme Court's
majority would, in Campbell's dissenting summation, "establish on
the soil of every State a caste made up of combinations of men for
the most part under the most favorable conditions of society, who
will habitually look beyond the institutions and authorities of the
State, to the central Government for the strength and support necessary to maintain them in the enjoyment of their special privileges and
exemptions," 65 a statement rather prophetic both of the post-Civil War
era of the "robber barons" and of C. Wright Mills' conception of contemporary America. 66 Campbell's dissent failed to shake the majority in the Dodge case, but may conceivably have had persuasive
influence in later decisions.
Whatever the ultimate explanation, the "plain distinction . . . between statutes that create hopes, expectations . . . and those which
form contracts" which Campbell enunciated in his earlier dissent in
the Knoop case was destined to bring limited success to his efforts
to curtail the perpetuation of legislative tax privileges, for by 1860,
he was able to apply this distinction in a majority opinion unanimously
supported by the other members of the Taney Court. The opinion,
written by Justice Campbell in Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia,67 was explicitly grounded in Benthamite theory. The case concerned the following set of facts. In 1833 the Pennsylvania legislature
sought to aid the Christ Church Hospital, "an asylum to numerous
poor and distressed widows," by providing that,
64. Id. at 370-71.
65. Id. at 373.
66. ILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
67. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300 (1860).
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the real property, including ground rents, now belonging and payable
to Christ Church Hospital, . . . so long as the same shall continue
to be68
long to the said hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes.
Later, in 1851, the state legislature repealed all such property tax
exemptions. As a consequence, the hospital authorities attacked the
repealing law as an unconstitutional violation of a "perpetual" tax
exemption contract. To a great extent the arguments of counsel in
the case were devoted to the question "whether the reason given for
exempting the property was a legal consideration of a contract or only
a motive alleged for passing the laws."
. Perhaps the most apt comparison of this decision is with the Marshall
Court's Dartmouth College decision. Like Christ Church Hospital,
Dartmouth College was a private eleemosynary institution. Both were
operated for purposes other than the acquisition of profit. But where
in the DartmouthCollege case, Marshall simply assumed that a charter
of incorporation is a contract,69 Campbell, in the Christ Church Hospital case, turned directly to an inquiry into the motives of the state
legislators, concluding that,
The inducements that moved the Legislature to concede the favor contained in the Act
7 0 of 1833 are special, and were probably temporary in
their operation.
The concurring opinion of Justice Story in the Dartmouth College
case spelled out in much greater detail than the more politic Marshall
the precise implications of that early decision. Consequently, a comparison of Story and Campbell on several key issues is of especial
importance in establishing the ideological bases for the two cases.
The Pennsylvania tax exemption of 1833 was not, of course, a portion
of a corporate charter, but did represent the type of special privilege
which so frequently was granted in that period by state legislatures
in such charters. To a great extent Campbell's decision turned on
the question of consideration; since the tax exemption was "spontaneous, and no service or duty, or other remunerative condition was
imposed upon the corporation," the law did not constitute a contract
but belonged to a class "denominated privilegia favorabiiia." Story,
on the other hand, had dismissed the question of consideration, although he did claim, incidentally, that consideration was present in
the Dartmouth College Charter transaction. His major position,
however, was grounded firmly on Blackstone's assertion that "a gift,
completely executed, is irrevocable." He also made explicit a principle implicit in Marshall's majority opinion that unless the power to
revise or amend a charter is reserved by the grantor of a charter,
68. Id. at 301.
69. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 463, 484 (1819).
70. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300, 303 (1860).
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revision and alteration are forbidden. To repeat Story's words, "government has no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when
7
given to a private person, or a corporation, for special uses." '
Although Campbell carefully avoided any reference to the earlier
Marshall decision, his reasoning in the Christ Church Hospital decision
was virtually a point by point refutation of Marshall and Story.
Campbell argued that an interpretation supporting the view that the
tax exemption was perpetual "is not to be favored, as the power of
taxation is necessary to the existence of the state, and must be exerted
according to the varying conditions of the commonwealth." Drawing
directly upon the political theory of Bentham, Campbell observed;
All laws for political institutions are dispositions for the future, and their
professed object is to afford a steady and permanent security to the interests of society. Bentham says, "that all laws may be said to be framed
with a view to perpetuity; but perpetual is not synonymous to irrevocable;
and the principle upon which all laws ought to be, and the greater part
have been established, is that of defeasible perpetuity-a perpetuity defeasible by an alternation of the circumstances and reasons on which
the law is founded." 72
This virtually complete ideological reversal by the full membership
of the Taney Court in 1860 was accomplished without overt objection
despite the fact that a majority of the same Court had heretofore
consistently applied the contract clause interpretations of Marshall
and Story. Technically, the Christ Church case was not precisely
similar to the earlier Marshall Court decisions, but intellectually, it
incorporated contradictory conceptions of property rights and social
obligation. The implications of possible application of Campbell's
reasoning were tremendous for future corporate relations with state
governments. But because of the crisis in American history precipitated by the slavery issue, Benthamite influence in the contract clause
interpretations of the Supreme Court literally disappeared at the
very occasion of its emergence in a majority opinion, for the outbreak
of the Civil War brought Justice Campbell's resignation early in 1861.
By the time of his resignation Campbell had been considered one of
the three most influential men on the Court (with Chief Justice Taney
and Justice Nelson), and was known to be Taney's choice as successor
to the Chief JusticeshipY3 Instead, Campbell was destined to devote
his talents, during the war years, to the task of administering the draft
laws of the Confederacy. Within a decade all but two members of the
Taney Court that handed down the Christ Church decision of 1860
had died or resigned. In their places sat Justices like Stephen J. Field
and Joseph Bradley who not only largely ignored the contract clause
71. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 506-533 (1819).
72. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 302-03 (1860).
73. Duncan, supra note 45, at 113.
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interpretations of Campbell, but revived natural law as an explicit
medium in constitutional interpretation, 74 and evolved a series of
substantive interpretations of the due process clause of the newly
adopted fourteenth amendment which proved far more effective safeguards to the rights of corporate property than anything that Marshall
or Story had dreamed of.
In one of the great ironies of history, it was former Supreme Court
Justice Campbell in his argument before the Supreme Court in the
SlaughterhouseCases who contributed significantly to the development
of the very ideas so ably applied by Justices Field and Bradley.7 5
As counsel for the butchers of New Orleans, Campbell was still arguing
against corporate power and especially monopoly. But he recognized
clearly that the states no longer represented the main bulwark of
social justice against the predatory aspirations of corporations. In
fact the slaughterhouse monopoly which he opposed had been bestowed by the Louisiana legislature. By implication Campbell
discounted the possibility of positive intervention by the federal
government, a conclusion which may have been amply justified in
the era of President Grant. The logic of Campbell's position may well
have suggested a retreat to natural law and the negative protection
afforded by federal judicial intervention. Campbell's invocation of
natural law and his appeal for "free competition in business, free
enterprise ... the absence of all spoliation of private right by public
authority" 76 was not completely inconsistent with Bentham's philosophy, for Bentham himself admired the economic thought of Adam
Smith. 7 Yet despite the fact that Campbell obviously directed his
argument against monopoly, here public in origin, conservative
justices as well as conservative lawyers seized upon his brief for
interpretative purposes quite different from those espoused by Campbell when he had served on the Court. The main beneficiaries of this
interpretative development were not the small businessmen, the
local butchers of New Orleans, whom Campbell had sought to defend,
but the very corporations which Campbell had once characterized as
motivated by "a love of power, a preference for corporate interests to
moral or political principles or public duties, and an antagonism to
individual freedom .... ')78
The philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, which had, for a brief interlude, served as a medium for establishing a greater measure of state
power to safeguard social interests in America was destined to remain
for many years of remote intellectual influence in American legal
74.
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75. Twiss, op. cit. supra note 42, at 42-58.
76. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 45-48 (1872).
77. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 307-09.
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affairs. So far as the Supreme Court was concerned, this essentially
pragmatic philosophy did not have an advocate until the appointment
of Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.

